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RECENT DECISIONS
and properly over the road." 3 The courts have decided many cases
involving the aforementioned proposition, but other issues were also
present.4 In the instant case, however, the court for the first time
was presented solely with the question of liability for seating accom-
modations.
The New York courts have merely required the common carriers
to use reasonable care in supplying seating capacity for those whom
it may duly anticipate will use its service. 5 What will be reasonable
care, under one set of circumstances and not so under another, is
usually a question of fact for the jury. Other jurisdictions hold that
the care required is that degree of prudence which would be used by
a very cautious and competent person under similar circumstances. 6
As early as 1866, the court in the case of Willis v. Long Island R. R.7
recognized that such proper accommodations as is the duty of the
common carrier to provide, means a seat for each passenger and not
standing room in the passageway.
A passenger does not waive his rights to damages as a result of
discomfort, by staying on the train until it reaches its destination,
where he is given no notice, express or implied, of the carrier's inabil-
ity to adequately transport him.8 And conversely, if he is forewarned
of the insufficient transport arrangements, no damages will lie.
M. S. M.
COMMON CARRIERS-BILL OF LADING AS PRIMA FACIE Evi-
DENCE OF RECEIPT OF GOODS IN GOOD CONDITION-MEASURE OF
DAMAGEs.-Plaintiff instituted an action against a common carrier
of goods in interstate commerce for damage to two carloads of grapes
in transit. The grapes were packed in standard containers with open
tops, so as to permit ventilation and inspection. The injury com-
'Willis v. Long Island R. R., 34 N. Y. 670 (1866).
'Willis v. Long Island R. R., 34 N. Y. 670 (1866); Thorpe v. N. Y. Cen-
tral R. R., 76 N. Y. 402 (1879); City & Newtown R. R., 87 N. Y. 67 (1881);
Campbell v. Pullman Co., 169 N. Y. Supp. 1087 (1918).
1 Haidenbergh v. St. Paul M. & M. R. R., 39 Minn. 3, 38 N. W. 625 (1888).
'Galveston v. Morris, 94 Tex. 505, 61 S. W. 709 (1901) ; Intern. R. R.,
20 Tex. Civ. App. 587, 50 S. W. 732 (1899) ; St. Louis S. W. R. R. v. Tittle,
53 Tex. Civ. App. 220, 115 S. W. 640 (19092.
734 N. Y. 670 (1866).
8Alabama Great South. R. R. v. Gilbert, 6 Ala. 372, 60 So. 542 (1912);
Evansville v. Duncan, 28 Ind. 441 (1867); Hallow v. Louisville R. R., 290
Ky. 287, 272 S. W. 740 (1925); Purcell v. Richmond R. R., 108 N. C. 414,
12 S. E. 954 (1891). Lack of notice to the passenger that adequate seating
will not be provided, with the choice that necessarily follows of either accepting
what the carrier is able to furnish or refusing it, implies an undertaking to
supply fully sufficient accommodations. In the instant case, the plaintiff was
led to believe, affirmatively, that a proper seat would be furnished him.
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plained of, consisted of damage to the containers and contents which
was caused by physical external forces, and was readily ascertainable
at the destination. Plaintiff offered in evidence bills of lading of the
initial carrier which acknowledged receipt of the property "in appar-
ent good order, except as noted (contents and condition of contents
of packages unknown)." No exceptions were noted. Plaintiff proved
the market value of the shipments at destination in the condition in
which they were delivered and in the condition in which they should
have been delivered. The disposal of the damaged portions was in
accordance with the usage and custom of the trade. Defendant moved
to set aside the verdict on the grounds: (1) no evidence of condition
at shipping point; and (2) plaintiff did not establish the extent of
his damages. Held, the bills of lading were prima facie evidence of
shipment of the goods in good condition, and plaintiff's proof of dam-
ages was sufficient for the jury to assess damages. Schwalb v. Erie
R. R., 161 Misc. 743, 293 N. Y. Supp. 842 (1937).
A bill of lading is a receipt for the goods, a contract for their
carriage and a documentary evidence of their title.1 In an action
for injury to the goods, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that
they were in good condition when delivered to the carrier, and that
the bad condition complained of resulted while the goods were in the
carrier's possession.2 However, if the plaintiff proves that the goods
were in good condition at the time of delivery to the common carrier,
a presumption of continuance will result in his favor.8 If the condi-
tion of the goods was 'apparent on ordinary inspection, a prima facie
presumption that the goods were received by the carrier in good con-
dition arises when the carrier issues a bill of lading without objection
of exception noted therein. 4  When the bill of lading contains a re-
cital that the contents and condition of the shipment are unknown
there will be no presumption as to the condition not apparent on ordi-
nary inspection, 5 but the condition of the goods being ascertainable
on casual inspection the clause "contents and condition unknown"
becomes inapplicable and the presumption arises. 6
'Ellis v. Willard, 9 N. Y. 529 (1854); Meyer v. Peck, 28 N. Y. 590
(1864); American Cotton Products Co., Inc. v. N. Y. Central R. R., 142 Misc.
821, 225 N. Y. Supp. 672 (1932).
' Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. 282 (U. S. 1851); Miller v. Hannibal & St.
J. R. R., 90 N. Y. 430 (1882); Jean v. Flagg, 45 Misc. 421, 90 N. Y. Supp.
289 (1904); E. C. Fuller Co. v. Penna. R. R., 61 Misc. 599, 113 N. Y. Supp.
1001 (1909).
' Remington v. Barrett, 235 N. Y. 519, 139 N. E. 717 (1923).
'Carleton v. Union Transfer Co., 137 App. Div. 225, 121 N. Y. Supp. 997(1st Dept. 1910) ; Foley v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 96 N. Y. Supp. 182 (1905).
' Dworkwitz v. N. Y. Central R. R., 230 N. Y. 188, 129 N. E. 230 (1920);
Josephy v. Pan. & S. F. R. R., 235 N. Y. 306, 139 N. E. 277 (1923); Nelson
v. Stephenson, 12 N. Y. Super. 538 (1856).
' Sprotte v. Del., L. & W. R. R., 90 N. J. L. 720, 101 Atl. 518 (1917);
Leonard v. Penna. R. R., N. Y. L. J., April 15, 1932, p. 2088, App. Term, 1st
Dept; Leonard v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., N. Y. L. J., Dec. 19, 1936, p.
2288, App. Term, 1st Dept.
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In the absence of special contract, the extent of damages is the
difference between the market value of the shipment at destination
in the condition in which tendered to the consignee and the condi-
tion in which it was delivered to the carrier, the damaged portions
being disposed of in accordance with the usage and custom of the
trade.7  Consignee must accept the damaged goods and take all rea-
sonable steps to minimize damages, unless the shipment is so dam-
aged as to be valueless. Consignee-plaintiff is then entitled to be put
in as good a position as he would have been had the defendant carrier
delivered the shipment uninjured, regard being had in applying the
measure of damages to the use and the purpose for which the ship-
ment was intended.8
In the instant case, the plaintiff having met both the require-
ments of "condition" and "damages", the judgment was correctly
rendered.
W. D. D.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DEcr AND INDIRECT EFFECT UPON
COMMERCE-DuE PRocEss.-Respondent corporation is one of the
largest manufacturers of steel in America. It receives most of its raw
materials from, and ships seventy-five per cent of its products to states
other than Pennsylvania in which it has its principal mills. It em-
ploys more than a half million men. Respondent discharged nine men,
allegedly for engaging in union activities. All of the discharged men
were engaged in manufacturing in the respondent's Pennsylvania
mills. The discharged men appealed to the National Labor Relations
Board which found the respondent had violated the National Labor
Relations Act 1 by engaging in unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce. The Board ordered the respondent to offer reinstatement to
the discharged men and to make good their losses in pay. Upon failure
of the corporation to comply, the Board petitioned the Circuit Court
of Appeals to enforce the order. The Court denied the petition hold-
ing the Act unconstitutional in so far as it affects manufacturing or
"10 CoRPUS JURis 395, § 606; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. McCaull-
Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S. 97, 40 Sup. Ct. 504 (1920) ; Kilthau v. International
Mercantile Marine Co., 245 N. Y. 361, 157 N. E. 267 (1927) ; King v. Sherwood,
22 App. Div. 548, 48 N. Y. Supp. .34 (2d Dept. 1897) ; Porter v. Penna. R. M,
217 App. Div. 49, 215 N. Y. Supp. 727 (7th Dept. 1926); Perkel v. Penna.
R. R., 148 Misc. 284, 265 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1933); Crinella v. Northwestern
Pac. R. R., 85 Cal. App. 440, 259 Pac. 774 (1927).
' Perkel v. Penna. R. R., 148 Misc. 284, 265 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1933).
'Act of July 5, 1935, 49 STAT. at L. 449, c. 372, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1935);(1936) 10 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 359 (discussion of provisions of bill). Labor is
guaranteed the right to organize, and employers are forbidden to interfere with
labor's rights. Such interference is termed an unfair labor practice.
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